A Critical Exposition of Gertrude Elizabeth Margaret Anscombe’s Moral Philosophy

Abstract

This paper offers a critical exposition of Gertrude Elizabeth Margaret Anscombe’s moral philosophy, particularly her challenge to modern ethical theories and her revival of Aristotelian virtue ethics. At a time when utilitarianism and deontology dominated Anglo-American moral discourse, Anscombe argued that key moral concepts such as “duty” and
“moral obligation” had lost coherence when divorced from their original theistic and legal contexts. Drawing on qualitative textual analysis, the study explores Anscombe’s critique of consequentialism, her account of intentionality and moral responsibility, and her ethical positions on human sexuality, family, and natural law. The research finds that Anscombe’s emphasis on virtue, intention, and teleological human flourishing offers a robust alternative to rule-based ethical models. It further evaluates her influence on contemporary virtue ethics and highlights areas where her views intersect with and diverge from other moral thinkers. The study concludes that Anscombe’s insistence on a moral structure and ability rooted in virtue, natural law, and coherent psychological understanding remains vital for addressing today’s ethical challenges. It recommends that ethical laws and societal norms should not only be action-guiding but must also align with natural and divine law to foster genuine moral development. Ultimately, while human societies may be sustained by legal systems, the cultivation of virtue remains indispensable for long-term ethical stability and human flourishing.