The Epistemic Valuation of Martin Heidegger’s Notion of Self and the other

Abstract

This paper is an epistemic valuation of Martin Heidegger’s notion of the self and other entities (beings). Heidegger explored the concept of the self and that of others more subjectively from within our human experience against Husserl’s transcendentalism. He had in his mind, the aim of establishing a solid and sound phenomenological foundation of the self and other entities as epistemic fundamental ontology. To avoid Cartesian language, Heidegger suggests a new terminology Dasein (being-in-the-world). He conceived ‘self’ basically as Dasein, which he said is our most primitive and basic view of things. This work looks at Heidegger’s attempt to solve the problem of philosophy through epistemic exploration of self and the others. The study adopts expository and descriptive methods with the view of addressing the human existential features of the self within the world. The study finds out that Heidegger’s epistemic valuation of the self (Dasein) and other entities as against traditional approach, is not only an attempt against Husserl and Cartesian reductionism but also against any epistemic program that focuses rather upon the full range of experienced phenomena without separating it into distinct parts. The study concludes that Heidegger’s understanding of the self and other entities in the world is fallible and subject to reconstruction and re-examination. This is why he talks of rehabilitation of beliefs at the tribunal of experience.