



MU-TAJOP



Vol. 1 No. 1 February, 2022

Maiden Edition

**Madonna University**  
**Thought and Action**  
**Journal of Philosophy**

*...liberating the world with reasoning*

*A publication of Department of Philosophy Madonna University, Nigeria*  
thoughtandactiontajp@gmail.com

**Rectificatory  
and Restorative  
Justice  
Paradigms: A  
Comparative  
Analysis**

*Akpa Ejike*

Department of Philosophy  
Madonna University, Nigeria

## Rectificatory and Restorative Justice Paradigms: A Comparative Analysis

*Akpa Ejike*

Department of Philosophy  
Madonna University, Nigeria

### Abstract

*Injuries caused by crime and wrongdoings require to be redressed in the interest of mankind and preservation of society, for crime limits peace, order, harmony and progress. It harms relationships between individuals, perpetuates injustice and inequality and ultimately diminishes the joy of life in the society. To right the wrong caused by crime, Aristotle opines that rectificatory or corrective justice be resorted to; in that wise, the concern of the judge will be to restore equality between the parties whose relationship or transaction has fallen into a state of inequality. To remove the inequality, the judge punishes the offender by taking from him the excess he unjustifiably obtained and returns same to the victim. By so doing, equality is restored. For Howard Zehr however, restorative justice makes a better alternative as it focuses on healing injured relationships and crime is harm to individual persons and their relationships. To make things right, restorative justice is concerned with the needs of all stakeholders (victim, offender, and community), healing, accountability, and restoration of the pre-crime cordiality between conflicting parties. Aristotle and Zehr in their respective theories aim at making things right ultimately but between the two one ought to be more appropriate; which one is? Restorative justice seems more appropriate yet it has challenges that make it insufficient, hence, the advocacy for a complementary relationship between rectificatory and restorative justice paradigms.*

**Key Words:** Justice, Rectification, Restoration, Crime, Cordiality, Complementariness

### Introduction

Crime constitutes a monumental menace to human wellness and societal harmony. It is a hindrance to peace, cordiality and progress. Left unchecked, crime can cause the society to disintegrate and misery for the whole of humanity. On that note, Michael Newton (2017) rightly observes that “no one on earth today escapes the touch of crime” (p. 17). Each time a crime is committed the perpetrator takes advantage of his/her victim thereby causing inequality in their relationship; the remedy is for justice to be done. The way to do justice raises different opinions. In consideration here are rectificatory or corrective justice as articulated by Aristotle, and restorative justice as propagated by Howard Zehr.

Rectificatory justice, according to Aristotle, remedies the imbalance and inequality that arise from voluntary and involuntary transactions between individuals. He views the injury done by one man to another as an injustice and a kind of inequality in their relationship. With the belief that injustice is a kind of inequality, Aristotle opines that the law, in the bid to correct the injustice, mandates the judge to “equalize things by means of the penalty, taking away from the gain of the assailant” (Aristotle, 2001, 1132a). This is the core of retributive justice. In opposition to retributivism which rectificatory justice of Aristotle tilts to, Zehr proposes the restorative justice paradigm as an alternative way of viewing the problem and solution of crime. He views crime as a violation of people and relationships rather than a violation of the state. Crime creates obligations to make things right and “justice involves the victim, the offender, and the community in a search for solutions which promote repair, reconciliation, and reassurance” (Zehr, 1990, p. 181). Being that Aristotle’s rectificatory justice and Zehr’s restorative justice are both interested in making things right ultimately, the problem that may arise pertains to ‘which is more appropriate in terms of sufficiency and total wellness of human kind and harmony in the society?’ Obviously, both are good intentioned though, restorative may seem to be more appropriate. Nevertheless, neither is singularly sufficient, hence, the need for one to complement the other in a collaborative engagement.

### **What is Justice?**

It is the name of justice that coercion and resistance to oppression find legitimacy. Justice provides every society with its most fundamental rules of social order and gives people the impetus to challenge the activities of other people and those of government when necessary just as the government has the impetus to inflict punishment on those who violate the rules. So, what is justice?

The question of the meaning of justice has been of concern to philosophers from the ancient times till our present day, hence, the many views and burgeoning literature. Plato, in the *Republic*, sees justice as a virtue establishing rational order; each part performing its appropriate role without being meddlesome in the functions and roles of others. It is “to mind one’s own business and not to be meddlesome ... to do one’s own business” (Plato, 1997, p. 129). There is justice in the individual when each of the three parts of the human soul – rational, spirited, and appetitive – does its work without meddling and not being meddled with. Likewise, there is justice in the society when the rulers (rational), the soldiers (spirited), and workers (appetitive) perform their duties harmoniously and without meddlesomeness.

In *Summa Theologiae* of Thomas Aquinas, justice is founded on the notion of ‘*jus*’ or ‘right’. Aquinas, like Aristotle, sees justice as an ethical virtue. He assigns to justice the task of regulating or directing a person’s actions in compliance with reason. He defines justice as “a habit whereby a man renders to each one his due by a constant and perpetual will” (Aquinas, 1911, II-II. q. 58. a2).

In the modern era as in the ancient and medieval periods, justice occupied the centre stage of political philosophy. Thomas Hobbes (1994) viewed justice as no more than an artificial virtue necessary and inevitable for security and peaceful civil society against the backdrop of a state of nature wherein life was “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short” (p. 76). It was the fear of

death, especially violent death in the state of nature that prompted men, directed by reason, to enter into a social contract to form the political state. By so doing, they discovered the need for law and justice, hitherto unnecessary, as no action was unjust. Hobbes further notes that “when a covenant is made, then to break it is unjust; and the definition of injustice is no other than the non-performance of covenant. And whatsoever is not unjust is just” (p. 89). Failure to obey the laws of the state is visited with punishment.

Whereas the state of nature was a state of war for Hobbes, it was characterized by liberty and equality, though, not of licence, according to John Locke. His idea of justice is founded on the principle of equality which all men enjoy naturally. It is unjust for any man to subordinate another or subject another man to an inferior position. It is particularly unjust to trample upon the freedom and rights of others especially upon the freedom and rights to life, liberty, and property. He cautions that “though this be a state of liberty, yet it is not a state of license, though man in that state have an uncontrollable liberty, to dispose of his persons or possessions, yet he has not liberty to destroy himself....” (Locke, 1960, p. 311)

The German philosopher, Immanuel Kant, also emphasizing freedom articulated a theory of justice based on the dignity of the individual and universal law of freedom. He defines justice as “the aggregate of those conditions under which the will of one person can be conjoined with the will of another in accordance with a universal law of freedom” (Kant, 1999, p. 30). An action is judged just or unjust based on how much it upholds freedom. “Every action is just that is itself or in its maxim is such that freedom of the will of each can coexist together with the freedom of everyone in accordance with a universal law” (p. 30).

John Stuart Mill, the English utilitarian, gave an account of justice that ties together the different focal points that are traditionally evoked when we talk about justice. These are: rights, equality, fairness, desert, and impartiality. He writes that justice

appeared generally to involve the idea of personal right. Whether the injustice consists in depriving a person of a possession, or in breaking faith with him, or in treating him worse than he deserves, or worse than other people who have no greater claims, in each case the supposition implies two things – wrong done, and some assignable person who is wronged. Injustice may also be some by treating a person better than others.... Justice implies something which it is not only right to do, and wrong not to do, but some individual person can claim from us as his moral right. (Mill, 2003, p. 223)

Mill’s theory of justice is summarized by William Shaw (2012), to consist in (1) violating someone’s moral or legal rights; (2) a person’s failing to get what he or she deserves; (3) breaking faith with someone, violating one’s engagements; or (4) disappointing expectations that one has knowingly and voluntarily created; or (5) treating people unequally in situations where equality is called for.

In John Rawls’ *A Theory of Justice* (1971), one of the most influential works in political philosophy in the contemporary period, justice is equated with fairness. But what does fairness mean? Fairness is “a demand to avoid bias in our evaluations, taking note of the interest and concerns of others as well and in particular the need to avoid being influenced by our respective vested interests, or by our personal priorities or eccentricities or prejudices. It can be broadly

seen as a demand for impartiality” (Sen, 2009, p. 54). The primary problem of justice, according to Rawls, is to formulate and justify a set of principles which a just basic structure must satisfy. The function of the basic structure of society is to distribute the burdens and benefits of social cooperation among members of society. A just basic structure will be one which produces a proper distribution of possibilities for people to get hold of primary goods, such as income and health care.

Rawls proposes and defends two principles as a solution to the problem – Principle of Greatest Equal Liberty and Difference Principle.

First: Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive scheme of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar scheme of liberties for others.  
Second: Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both: (a) reasonably expected to be to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, and (b) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity. (Rawls, p. 118)

The first principle (Principle of Greatest Equal Liberty) claims that each of us is to have an equal right to the same total system of basic liberties and that this total system of basic liberties is to be as extensive as possible. The Difference Principle states that social and economic inequalities are to be arranged to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged. The inequalities in the basic structure must be seen as maximising the prospects of the worst-off in the society. If discrimination is to be allowed in favour of some and against some, it must only be on the condition that it “favours the disadvantaged” (Raphael, 2004, p. 5). The aim is to reduce inequality, to bring the needy a little nearer to the level of the better off. The aim of distributive justice, as conceived by Rawls, is to attain equality and to favour the needy in order to reduce inequality. Rawls’s principle was criticized by Robert Nozick (1999) for giving up too much liberty for the sake of equality and by Kai Nielsen (1979) for sacrificing social equality for individual liberty. The many views about justice demonstrate that it is a necessity for a happy society. Its attainment, like its meaning, is also diverse.

### **Rectificatory Justice**

The rectificatory or corrective justice paradigm is linked to Aristotle in his *Nicomachean Ethics* as he distinguishes between senses of justice. For him, there are two senses of justice – universal and particular senses. In the universal sense acts just if they tend to produce and preserve happiness (the ultimate goal) for the political society (Aristotle, 1129b). Justice, in this sense, is an attribute of character, the virtue that is exhibited by humans in their relation with others insofar as these interactions promote a good life and lead to happiness for the members of the political community. Particular justice on the other hand, is concerned with the share of benefits individuals should receive and the burdens they should bear in their voluntary relationships with others. Particular justice is further divided into two, viz., distributive justice and rectificatory justice. Distributive justice is manifested in the distribution of honours, money or other things among members of the state. By employing geometric proportion in distribution of benefits and burdens, each member of the community receives in direct proportion to his merit, in other words, a good person will receive more benefit than a bad person who will in turn receive more burden than a good person.

Rectificatory justice is one that “plays a rectifying part in transactions between man and man” (Aristotle, 1130a). It sets aright unequal distribution of gains and losses between two people. Rectificatory justice identifies criteria for righting past wrongs occasioned by unequal distribution. According to Colste (2015), rectificatory justice acknowledges that “there is a moral obligation to compensate for the consequences of harmful acts” (p. 10), so, it looks backwards in an attempt to right the wrongs done by one person to another. We are morally bound to right past wrongs done by one person to another.

Rectificatory justice, according to Aristotle, applies to private transactions of two types – voluntary and involuntary transactions. Transactions such as sale, purchase, loan, etc. are voluntary because their origin is voluntary, not by compulsion or by accident. Among involuntary transactions are (a) clandestine actions such as theft, adultery, poisoning, etc. and (b) violent actions such as assault, imprisonment, murder, and robbery (Aristotle, 1131a). We find ourselves in such transactions unwillingly and sometimes unknowingly. Rectificatory justice is based on arithmetical equality. This implies that the injured party (victim) will receive a proportion from the injuring party (offender). It looks not at the character of the persons involved; it only looks at what had been done. Aristotle opines that

it makes no difference whether a good man has defrauded a bad or a bad man a good one, nor whether it is a good or a bad man that has committed adultery; the law looks only to the distinctive character of injury, and treats the parties as equals. (Aristotle, 1132a)

Of utmost concern here is equality. When one man defrauds another, it is as if a line were divided into two unequal parts, the perpetrator possessing the longer part and the victim possessing the shorter part. A judge who is called upon to correct the injustice committed will take the excess away from the perpetrator and give it to the victim without reference to their characters. “What is significant here is that all parties are seen as having equal merit” (Scaltsas, 1995, p. 249).

Realizing equality which is the major concern of rectificatory justice poses a challenge where the deprivations are immaterial and injuries cannot be monetized or quantified materially for example in slander, rape, human rights abuse, murder, etc. In such cases the loss of the victim and the gain of the offender cannot be equalized. As observed by Heidt (1990) “corrective (rectificatory) justice is more difficult to apply to the ‘complex’ case in which the gains do not equal the losses” (p. 370).

### **Restorative Justice**

Howard Zehr, often regarded as the “grandfather of Restorative Justice” (Ness and Strong, 2010, p. 24) saw justice as pertaining to what are due to people when crime occurs hence, its concern would be what is due to the victim, to the offender, and to the community – the real stakeholders in any event of crime or wrongdoing. This is against the retributively dominated traditional criminal justice paradigm. For Zehr (2003) restorative justice is “a process to involve, to the extent possible, those who have some stake in a specific offense to collectively identify and address harms, needs and obligations in order to heal and put things as right as possible” (p. 27). Restorative justice cares for the wellbeing of both victims and offenders, offering plans for uprooting the root causes of the problem and assisting re-entry into the community instead of doling out measured doses of unproductive punitive measures. According

to John Braithwaite (2004) restorative justice is “a process where all the stakeholders affected by an injustice have an opportunity to discuss how they have been affected by the injustice and to decide what should be done to repair the harm” (p. 28). This corroborates Tony Marshall’s definition of restorative justice as “a process whereby all parties with a stake in a specific offense come together to resolve collectively how to deal with the aftermath of the offense and its implications for the future” (Marshall, 1999, p. 5). Central to restorative justice are righting of wrongs, collective effort of all those involved, and restoration of repair of damaged relationships, among other humane goals.

Restorative justice challenges many of the traditional assumptions pertaining to the delivery of justice; particularly the appropriateness of retribution and deterrence. It thus, seeks to reframe the way we conventionally think about wrongdoing and justice: to “move away from our preoccupation with law-breaking, guilt, and punishment toward a focus on harms, needs, and obligations” (Zehr, 2004, p. 306). Crime is understood not only as a violation of an abstract entity (the state), but also and mainly, as a violation of concrete persons and human relationships. Zehr (1990) rightly observes that

In criminal law, crime is defined as an offense against the state. The state, not the individual, is defined as victim. The state and only the state may respond. Since the state is the victim, criminal law pits offenders against the state. (p. 81)

In contrast, restorative justice advocates argue that in the aftermath of an offence concern is not with punishing offenders, but with repairing harm caused by the crime.

With the view that crime is a harm to people and relationships, restorative justice asks different questions from the ones asked by criminal justice in the bid to make things right. Zehr (2003) points out that criminal justice will ask (1) what laws have been broken. (2) Who did it? (3) What do they deserve? On the other hand restorative justice will ask (1) who has been hurt? (2) What are their needs? (3) Whose obligations are these? In response, restorative justice resorts to three important principles namely; harms and needs of stakeholders; obligations of offenders to put things right; and engagement of stakeholders (pp. 15-16). It is apt to note that for justice to be done, it is important that the law breaker is identified even if he will be pardoned.

In Zehr’s articulation, “the starting point must be the needs of those violated. When a crime occurs (regardless of whether an offender is identified) the first questions ought to be, ‘Who has been harmed? How have they been harmed? What are their needs?’” (Zehr, 1990, p. 191). While the needs of victims are paramount, other stakeholders’ needs are also taken into consideration to attain the ultimate goal of restorative justice which is to “provide an experience of healing for all concerned” (Zehr, 2003, p. 16).

As a violation of people and relationships, “crime creates obligations to make things right” (Zehr, 1990, p. 181). This implies holding the offender accountable and making him to be responsible for his actions: he is encouraged to understand the consequences of his behaviour and to take actions to put things right as much as possible. Putting right is indeed, the hub of restorative justice wheel as it brings about internal healing to the offender, restores the offender’s respect, and ensures a more stable and safer society.

Active participation of affected parties is another core element of restorative justice. Restorative justice prides itself as giving the primary parties or stakeholders the opportunity of active and voluntary participation in the justice delivery process. To support this practice, Margarita (2007) notes thus:

It is argued that victims, offenders and their communities can usually come up with more meaningful dispositions than those developed by judges and other 'experts' who lack knowledge of, and connection to, the parties affected by crime, and therefore are incapable of meeting the real needs created by the offence. (pp. 49-50)

Generally, it is believed that stakeholders' participation in the justice process enhances reparation of harm, reconciliation, victim/offender satisfaction, and offender reintegration.

Restorative justice aims at improving, repairing and restoring relationships; building healthy communities and decreasing crime and anti-social behaviour. It thus employs practices such as victim-offender mediation, family and community group conferencing, and sentencing circles to resolve issues. These practices are less adversarial, emphasize accountability, and encourage reconciliation.

### **Comparing rectificatory justice with restorative justice**

Rectificatory and restorative justice paradigms are both concerned with righting past wrongs, yet they differ. Comparing both discloses which is more appropriate in terms of sufficiency in securing total wellness for human kind, restoration of joy of life and harmony in the society. Rectificatory justice wants to right wrongs by means of punishment and lowering the offender. The offender is seen as a base person who should be punished in order to extract from him the equivalent of what he deprived another person. Restorative justice equally condemns criminality but seeks to right the wrong by healing and raising both victim and offender (Zehr, 1990, p. 213). It shows compassion even to offenders because all human persons are one and harm to one is harm to all. It disapproves of crime in totality and encourages the offenders to take responsibility and take actions to put things right to enable them get reintegrated into the society as useful members.

The primary concern of rectificatory justice is equality - equalizing the penalty of the offender with the harm suffered by the victim whereas the primary concern of restorative justice is total healing for all concerned. Proponents of restorative justice contend that its central idea is to make things right (Zehr, 2014). In this regard, it is the responsibility of the offender, with the support of the community, to right the wrongs he had done. He takes steps to repair the harm done to the victim and the impacted community. "This is what justice should be about" (Zehr, 1990, p. 197).

Rectificatory justice is inclined to retributivism with emphasis on punishment to establish equality between the victim's loss and the offender's gain. In restorative justice, emphasis is not much on punishment but on healing and restoration of relationships. Even if punishment is to play a part, it is in view of facilitating healing.

Generally, a crime or an offence affects three parties: the victim, offender, and the community as a whole. While rectificatory justice reposes the entire responsibility of correcting injustices



in the hands of the judge, restorative justice makes it a collective responsibility of all stakeholders or their representatives. Participation in the resolution process is open to all concerned. Involving stakeholders gives them a voice in a matter that concerns them. It further boosts their confidence, makes them feel satisfied, and increases the chances of reconciliation.

Rectificatory or corrective justice may also seek for victim empowerment and offender accountability but does not care about offender rehabilitation, community involvement and restoration of pre-crime cordiality. On the other hand, restorative justice has healing of all parties, reconciliation, reparation, community involvement, and re-enactment of pre-crime cordiality as its primary goals. Consequently, rectificatory justice focuses on punishment as a means of equalizing the gain of the offender with the loss of the victim whereas restorative justice relies on more human processes like counselling, education, rehabilitative processes, and only resorts to punitive measures like monitored imprisonment if it will facilitate healing. On the basis of its humaneness, restorative justice tries to evoke the virtues of forgiveness, charity and love on the side of a victim, while encouraging the offender to take responsibility for his crime and to take steps towards making reparation (materially or symbolically). Surprisingly, sincere apology and request for forgiveness go a long way in enhancing healing and restoration of conviviality. Ultimately, restorative justice would seek to reconcile the victim with the offender and their family members and friends while rectificatory justice is fixated on achieving equality.

Making right, whether via rectificatory justice or restorative justice; includes compensation which comes in three ways, namely: fines, restitution, and community service. A fine is a monetary penalty imposed on an offender and paid to the court. Incidentally, it is often not channelled towards addressing the loss of the victim, so, it contributes virtually nothing to the victim's recovery or healing process. Does fine stop crime? It may but to a little extent. It may actually ironically encourage more crime. Restitution refers to the practice of requiring offenders to financially compensate their victims for the damage caused them. The damage may be psychological, physical, or financial. Restitution serves two important purposes: it helps the victim to recover from his losses; and also enables the victim to consider forgiving the offender. Community service involves mandating an offender to render specific services to the community rather than directly compensating the victim or victims (Champion, 2008). Agreeing to do community service by an offender is a sign of expression of remorse and desire to be reintegrated into the community.

Rectificatory justice imposes fines most often and sometimes restitution. It resorts to the restitution when returning to a victim what had been unjustly taken away from him/her. However, this can only work in transactions like buying and selling, theft, and wilful damage of property. It may not likely work in cases like murder, rape, assault, insult, etc, since the aim of rectificatory justice is to set right by restoring equality. On the other hand, restorative justice very often resorts to restitution or community service. When restorative justice talks about compensation, it recognizes both financial/material and symbolic compensations. Zehr points out that "restitution by offenders is often important to victims, sometimes not just because of the actual losses, but just as importantly, because of the symbolic recognition restitution implies. When an offender makes an effort to make right the harm, even if only partially, it is a way of saying, "I am taking responsibility, and you are not to blame" (Zehr, 2014, p. 10).

Besides, restorative justice is always seeking healing and restoration of cordial relationships and compensation is believed to be hugely instrumental to attaining those goals.

Inasmuch as rectificatory justice has the intention of correcting the injustice done, it is more like giving someone a smack for doing something wrong. On the other hand, restorative justice also aims at correcting what has been wrongly done but not with a smack. It aims at getting the offender to take responsibility for his action, to understand the harm he has caused, to discourage him from reoffending, to give him an opportunity for redemption and reintegration. It uses counselling to bring about transformation in the offender and uses punishment only when it constitutes a part of the transformation process. The intention of restorative justice is not to abandon the offender but to make him a better person who will contribute his quota to societal well-being. It is in view of this that restorative justice is sometimes accused of being offender oriented and of giving the offenders soft landing instead of paying them in their own coin.

Who adjudicates and who participates in adjudication is a crucial matter in justice delivery. In rectificatory justice, the authority to adjudicate and determine what should be done to the offender in order to correct the imbalance or to rectify the injustice is solely reposed on the judge. As such the judge is the ultimate arbiter; he apportions penalties without recourse to the opinion of the stakeholders (victim, offender, and community). That is one major reason why people are dissatisfied with the criminal justice system. In contrast, restorative justice provides for and encourages the participation of the stakeholders in deciding the outcome of the processes. By so doing everyone is given a voice in a matter that concerns him or her. As a result of stakeholders' participation in dealing with the case, there is most often, a mutual agreement and a peaceful resolution.

### **Conclusion**

Given that crime is threatening to societal harmony and joy of life, the most appropriate thing to do is to approach justice. Whether the injustice is done to a particular individual or the society at large, doing justice requires that things are made right again. In view of this, the duo of rectification and restoration offer us alternative paradigms. Rectificatory justice, according to Aristotle, makes things right when one individual injures another in a transaction by restoring equality in the sense of taking away the excess from the wrongdoer and giving to the victim what is equal to what he lost. On another hand, Howard Zehr proposed the restorative justice system to put things right not just by restoring equality but emphasizing stakeholders' needs, holding offenders accountable, involvement of all stakeholders in resolution of the issue, and restoration of joy of life to the community through forgiveness, reconciliation and restoration of pre-crime conviviality. Hence, it employs all possible techniques including compensation, apology, education, and punishment (if need be).

When compared, it is seen that both paradigms aspire to make things right but in different ways. While rectificatory justice uses punishment basically, to re-establish equality; restorative justice adopts more humane approaches and only resorts to punishment if it will enhance healing and reparation of injured relationships. Again, unlike rectificatory justice which shuts stakeholders out of the process and cares less about their needs, restorative justice is participatory and emphasizes needs.

While it may seem as if restorative justice is more appropriate than rectificatory justice, it is not devoid of deficiencies which would also render it insufficient. In view of this, we advocate for a complementary relationship between both. Being that both systems have a common aim as well as inherent and resultant weaknesses, it is sensible to think that through complementariness the weakness of one system would be remedied by the strengthen of the other. In that way crime can be effectively tackled; conviviality, harmony and joy of life will be restored. In a summary, the society will be more conducive for human existence.

## References

- Aquinas, T. (1911). *Summa theologiae*. [<http://www.ccel.org/ccel/Aquinas/summa.html>]
- Aristotle, (2001), *Nichomachean ethics*. In R. McKeon (Ed.), *The basic works of Aristotle*. The Modern Library.
- Braithwaite, J. (2004). Restorative justice and de-professionalization. *The Good Society*, 13(1), 28-31.
- Champion, D. J. (2008). Criminal punishment. Microsoft Encarta [DVD]. Microsoft Corp.
- Colste, G. (2015). *Global Rectificatory justice*. Palgrave Macmillan.
- Graef, R. (2000). *Why restorative justice?: Repairing the harm caused by crime*. Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation.
- Hobbes, T. (1994). *Leviathan*. (E. Curley, Ed.). Hackett Publishing Co.
- Heidt, K. R. (1990). Corrective justice from Aristotle to second order liability: Who should pay when the culpable cannot? *Washington and Lee Law Review*, 47(2), 347-377.
- Kant, I. (1999). *The metaphysical elements of justice* (J. Ladd, Trans.), Hackett Publishing Company, Inc.
- Locke, J. (1960). *Two treatises of government*. Cambridge University Press.
- Margarita, Z. (2007). *Restorative Justice: Ideas and Realities*. Ashgate Publishing Ltd.
- Marshall, T. F. (1999). *Restorative justice: An overview*. Home Office Information and Publication Group.
- Mill, J. S. (2003). Utilitarianism. *Utilitarianism and on liberty* (Mary Warnock, Ed.), Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
- Newton, M. (2010). *Criminal justice: Crime and criminals*. Chelsea House Publishers.
- Nielsen, K. (1979). Radical egalitarian justice: Justice as equality. *Social theory and practice*, 5(2), 209-226.
- Nozick, R. (199). *Anarchy, state, and utopia*. Blackwell Publishers Ltd.
- Plato. (1997). *Republic*. (J. L. Davies & D. J. Vaughan, Trans.). Wordsworth Editions Ltd.
- Raphael, D. D. (2004). *Concepts of justice*. Oxford University Press.

Rawls, J. (1971). *A theory of justice*. The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press; 1971.

Scaltsas, T. (1995). Reciprocal justice in Aristotle's Nichomachean Ethics. *Archiv fur Geschichte der Philosophie*, 77. Bd., S. 248-262.

Sen, A. (2009). *The idea of justice*. The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.

Shaw, W. H. (2012). Justice, rights, and rules in Mill's utilitarianism. *Mill on justice* (Leonard Kahn,Ed.). Palgrave Macmillan Publishers.

Van Ness, D. W. & K. H. Strong. (2010). *Restoring justice – An introduction to restorative justice*. Matthew Bender & Co., Inc.

Zehr, H. (1990). *Changing Lenses: A New Focus for Crime and Justice*. Herald Press.

Zehr, H. (2004). Commentary: Restorative justice: Beyond victim-offender mediation, *Conflict Resolution Quarterly*, 22(1-2): 305-315.

Zehr, H. (2014). *The little book of restorative justice*. Good Books.